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"TRENDS IN INTELLIGENCE"

I PROPOSE TO SAY A FEW WORDS ABOUT "TRENDS IN INTELLIGENCE." NOW, THIS IS A PRETTY BROAD TOPIC, AND THE PROBLEM OF IDENTIFYING THE MORE IMPORTANT AND PERSISTENT TRENDS REMINDS ME OF THE DILEMMA OF A YOUNG ARAB PRINCE.

ON HIS TWENTY-FIRST BIRTHDAY HIS FATHER, THE RULER OF AN OIL-RICH SHEIKDOM, GAVE THE BOY A HAREM -- JUST A STARTER KIT OF 50 GIRLS OR SO.

THE NEXT DAY, AN ANXIOUS FRIEND WAS AMAZED TO FIND THE SHEIK'S SON IN A COFFEE HOUSE AT THE LOCAL BAZAAR, SITTING ALONE AND DRINKING LISTLESSLY.

"WHY ARE YOU HANGING AROUND HERE?" THE FRIEND ASKED. "WITH ALL THOSE LOVELY, LONELY GIRLS WAITING FOR YOU, DON'T YOU KNOW WHAT TO DO?"

"I KNOW WHAT TO DO," THE SHEIK'S SON ANSWERED, "I JUST DON'T KNOW WHERE TO START!"

AND SO IT IS WITH "TRENDS IN INTELLIGENCE."  
THE TOPIC IS CERTAINLY MORE OPEN TO A SHEIK'S  
CHOICE OF SUBJECTS THAN IS THE MATERIAL WHICH THE  
MEMBERS OF THIS COURSE HAVE COVERED, BUT IT IS,  
I BELIEVE, MOST IMPORTANT THAT WE WHO ARE ENGAGED  
IN INTELLIGENCE WORK TAKE TIME OUT OCCASIONALLY, STAND  
BACK FROM OUR DAY-TO-DAY PROBLEMS, AND ASSESS  
WHERE WE STAND AND IN WHAT DIRECTION WE ARE MOVING.  
ONLY IF WE DO TAKE STOCK AT REGULAR INTERVALS, CAN  
WE CHART A COURSE FOR OURSELVES, INSTEAD OF MERELY  
REACTING TO AND KEEPING PACE WITH THE PRESSURES  
AND PROBLEMS THAT AFFECT US ALL.

SO LET ME TRY TO IDENTIFY FOR YOU SEVERAL OF  
THE TRENDS WHICH STRIKE ME AS HAVING A SIGNIFICANT  
AND PERSISTENT INFLUENCE UPON OUR BUSINESS.

I BELIEVE WE SHOULD PUT AT THE TOP OF THIS LIST THE GROWING PROBLEM OF GEOGRAPHICAL ACCESS FOR LOCATING ABROAD OUR INTELLIGENCE BASES AND FACILITIES. A DECADE AGO, THE AMERICAN PRESENCE SERVED AS A REASSURING SYMBOL OF SECURITY TO THE HOST GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES. BUT AS THE COLD WAR HAS THAWED OUT MORE AND MORE IN THE 1960'S, OUR INSTALLATIONS ON FOREIGN SOIL, INCLUDING INTELLIGENCE FACILITIES, HAVE BECOME LESS WELCOME GUESTS. NOW THE AMERICAN PRESENCE, PARTICULARLY FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES, IS BEING EXPLOITED BY COMMUNIST PROPAGANDISTS AND NATIONALIST AGITATORS WHO PORTRAY IT AS EVIDENCE OF "IMPERIALIST" OR "COLONIALIST" DOMINATION.

CLEARLY WE ARE UNDER INCREASING PRESSURES TO WITHDRAW, OR TO REDUCE OUR VISIBILITY, OR TO PAY EVER

LARGER "RENTS" IN THE FORM OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID. NO PARTICULAR INSIGHT IS REQUIRED TO SEE THAT WE WILL GENERALLY FIND IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO SECURE ACCESS TO AND USE REAL ESTATE IN COUNTRIES BORDERING COMMUNIST POWERS. AS A CONSEQUENCE, WE MUST DEVELOP ALTERNATIVES. THESE INCLUDE TECHNICAL ALTERNATIVES, SUCH AS VARIOUS MOBILE PLATFORMS. ANOTHER TYPE OF SUBSTITUTE, IN PLACES WHERE WE CAN STILL GET A FOOT IN THE DOOR, IS MORE EFFICIENT AND LESS CONSPICUOUS INSTALLATIONS OPERATED BY FEWER PERSONNEL. THIS TREND APPLIES TO THE FACILITIES OF ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

THIS SHIFT IN ATTITUDE TOWARD OUR FACILITIES AND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IS ALSO PART OF A HEIGHTENED SENSITIVITY, ABROAD AS WELL AS IN THE UNITED STATES, TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. PART OF THIS AWARENESS AND HOSTILITY HAS BEEN AROUSED BY INTERNATIONAL PUBLICITY CAUSED BY OUR EFFORTS TO SECURE INTELLIGENCE. THE U-2 SHOOT DOWN OVER THE USSR; THE ATTACK ON THE USS LIBERTY AND THE CAPTURE OF THE PUEBLO; THE FAIRLY NUMEROUS INCIDENTS OVER THE YEARS INVOLVING ELINT AIRCRAFT, SUCH AS THE EC-121 OFF KOREA; THE ARREST AND JAILING OF AGENT PERSONNEL; AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE FLAPS HAVE CAUSED

FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND NEWS MEDIA TO BECOME PRETTY TWITCHY WHERE INTELLIGENCE MATTERS ARE CONCERNED. THIS IS NOT TO POINT A FINGER OF FAULT, BUT SIMPLY TO STATE A FACT OF LIFE. WHEN WE RUN RISKS, THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THAT ACCIDENTS WILL NOT OCCUR.

COMMUNIST AGENCIES HAVE ALSO EXPLOITED SUCH INCIDENTS TO THE FULLEST, THROUGH DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE AND PROPAGANDA CHARGES, AS A PART OF THEIR GENERAL ANTI-U.S. CAMPAIGN. AND LOCAL COMMUNIST ELEMENTS HAVE AGITATED A GREAT DEAL. THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF THE COMMUNIST STATES HAVE TRUMPED-UP CHARGES OF ESPIONAGE AGAINST INNOCENT WESTERN TOURISTS. THEY HAVE ALSO MUDDIED THE WATERS THROUGH A CAMPAIGN OF FORGERY AND VILIFICATION DIRECTED AGAINST U.S. INTELLIGENCE. CIA ESPECIALLY HAS BEEN THE TARGET OF THIS EFFORT IN THE UNDER-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. WHETHER THE HOST GOVERNMENT ACTS FROM GREED, RESENTMENT, OR HOSTILITY, OR IS SIMPLY UNABLE TO STAND THE HEAT OF OPPOSITION CRITICISM, THE RESULT IS THE SAME -- THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT TURNS CHILLY.

FOREIGN SENSITIVITY TOWARD INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS ITS COUNTERPART WITHIN THE UNITED STATES.

IN ADDITION TO THE INCIDENTS MENTIONED ABOVE, YOU ARE ALL FAMILIAR WITH THE PUBLICITY GENERATED BY THE DISCLOSURE OF CIA SUPPORT TO U.S. STUDENTS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES WHICH WERE DIRECTED AT OVERSEAS TARGETS. THERE HAS BEEN A RASH OF SPY LITERATURE AND TELEVISION PROGRAMS. ALL THESE HAVE COMBINED TO SENSITIZE CERTAIN SECTORS OF PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES. MANY DOMESTIC CRITICS OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAVE DEVELOPED A KIND OF KNEE-JERK REACTION. THEY DO NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE PURPOSES OF INTELLIGENCE, AND THE GREAT CONTRIBUTION INTELLIGENCE MAKES TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES. ON THE CONTRARY, THEY IMMEDIATELY RUSH TO BELIEVE THE WORST AND ISSUE FORTH WITH BLANKET CONDEMNATIONS.

PLEASE UNDERSTAND THAT I AM NOT TRYING TO MAINTAIN THAT MISTAKES HAVE NOT OCCURRED, OR THAT THE RISKS WE RUN HAVE NOT OCCASIONALLY BEEN MISCALCULATED. I AM SAYING THAT GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE CRITICS ALIKE SHOULD TRY TO BE OBJECTIVE AND TO KEEP THE EQUITIES -- AS WELL AS THE OCCASIONAL DISADVANTAGES -- IN MIND WHEN THEY DISCUSS THE SUBJECT. WE CAN BE OF SOME HELP BY CONDITIONING OUR PRIVATE ATTITUDES ALONG THAT SAME LINE.

ANOTHER FORM OF CRITICISM OFTEN PRODUCED BY MAJOR INTERNATIONAL CRISES CONCERNS ACCUSATIONS OF AN "INTELLIGENCE FAILURE." THE ERECTION OF THE BERLIN WALL, WARS AND COUPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, THE DOMINICAN CRISIS, THE 1968 TET OFFENSIVE IN VIETNAM AND MANY OTHER MAJOR EVENTS HAVE BEEN FOLLOWED BY CHARGES THAT U.S. INTELLIGENCE FAILED TO PROVIDE WARNINGS.

AS YOU KNOW, INTELLIGENCE WARNING HAS, IN FACT, BEEN GIVEN PRIOR TO MANY, IF NOT MOST, OF THESE CRISES. PUTTING ASIDE THE PROBLEM OF WHETHER THE CRITICS ARE WELL INFORMED, THE CHARGE OF FAILURE USUALLY STEMS FROM ONE OF TWO FACTORS. THE FIRST INVOLVES THE INTELLIGENCE WARNING ITSELF. JUST HOW PRECISE CAN INTELLIGENCE BE EXPECTED TO BE IN PREDICTING HOSTILE ACTIONS? OBVIOUSLY IT IS DESIRABLE THAT WE GIVE ADVANCE NOTICE OF EXACTLY THE WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, HOW AND WHY OF THE HOSTILE ACTION OR DEVELOPMENT. THIS DEGREE OF PERFECTION HAS SELDOM BEEN ATTAINED IN THE HISTORY OF INTELLIGENCE. ONE BENDS EVERY EFFORT TO GIVE THE POLICY MAKER THIS KIND OF WARNING, BUT ONLY RARELY IS IT POSSIBLE TO PENETRATE THE ENEMY'S PROTECTIVE BARRIERS SUFFICIENTLY TO PROVIDE A FULLY RELIABLE, DETAILED



NOTICE IN ADVANCE OF THE PRECISE TIME AND NATURE OF A HOSTILE ACTION.

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN IS THAT IN MANY CASES OF SO-CALLED FAILURES, WE HAVE PROVIDED INTELLIGENCE WARNINGS, BUT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT -- FOR VARIOUS REASONS -- HAS NOT BEEN IN A POSITION TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT. THE CONSTRAINTS OF TODAY'S WORLD SOMETIMES MAKE IT A LOSING PROPOSITION TO ACT ON WHAT WE KNOW. THIS CAN BE FRUSTRATING.

IN OTHER CASES, POLICY-MAKERS MIGHT BE UNWILLING TO ACCEPT AN INTELLIGENCE WARNING WHICH IS NOT PALATABLE AND WHICH WOULD REQUIRE ACTION. THIS IS THE PROBLEM OF INTELLIGENCE CREDIBILITY. IN EITHER CASE THE UNINFORMED CRITIC CONFUSES DISMAY, WHICH STEMS FROM OUR INABILITY TO ACT, WITH WHAT HE THEN CALLS "SURPRISE."

ANOTHER FACTOR WE MUST FACE IS THE CONSTANTLY IMPROVING SECURITY OF OUR PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE TARGETS. TO A CERTAIN EXTENT THIS IS THE OLD RACE, WELL KNOWN IN MILITARY MATTERS, BETWEEN THE OFFENSE AND THE DEFENSE, AS IT APPLIES TO INTELLIGENCE.

THE DEFENSIVE ABILITIES OF OUR MAIN TARGETS SEEM TO GROW AS THE PRESENT LIMBO BETWEEN REAL PEACE

AND MAJOR WAR LENGTHENS OUT. DURING MILITARY HOSTILITIES, INTELLIGENCE OPPORTUNITIES TEND TO OPEN UP, AS THE ENEMY'S NEED TO ACT SWIFTLY DENIES HIM TIME FOR ELABORATE SECURITY MEASURES.

AS WE LEAVE WORLD WAR II FURTHER BEHIND, THE SECURITY OF OUR INTELLIGENCE TARGETS BECOMES BETTER ORGANIZED AND MORE EFFECTIVE. AS A RESULT, EVER MORE EXTENSIVE, COSTLY, AND IMAGINATIVE EFFORTS ARE REQUIRED TO PENETRATE THE SECURITY BARRIERS AND TO PRODUCE HIGH LEVEL INTELLIGENCE RESULTS.

THE TRENDS I HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING SO FAR LARGELY CONCERN THE WORLD OUTSIDE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY -- OUR INTELLIGENCE TARGETS, THIRD COUNTRY GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES, AND OUR CRITICS. LET US IDENTIFY A FEW TRENDS WITHIN THE PROFESSION ITSELF.

ALTHOUGH THE FUNDS EXPENDED AND THE PERSONNEL EMPLOYED IN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES ARE CLOSELY GUARDED, IT IS WELL UNDERSTOOD THAT BOTH HAVE BEEN STEADILY INCREASING FOR THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS. APART FROM INFLATIONARY PRESSURES AT HOME AND ABROAD, THERE ARE SEVERAL REASONS FOR THIS.

OBVIOUSLY, WITH SUCCESSIVE PAY RAISES, OUR PERSONNEL COSTS HAVE RISEN, AND THIS IS NO SMALL ITEM. BUT EVEN MORE IMPORTANT HAS BEEN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNOLOGICALLY ADVANCED SYSTEMS TO COLLECT AND EXPLOIT DATA OBTAINABLE BY SOPHISTICATED SENSORS. THE SYSTEMS ARE LARGE AND COSTLY, AND THEY REQUIRE HIGHLY SKILLED PERSONNEL. MANY OF THEM USE MOBILE PLATFORMS, OR ARE DESIGNED FOR OPERATION IN UNUSUAL LOCATIONS. THEY OFTEN GOBBLE UP VAST QUANTITIES OF DATA WHICH REQUIRE EXPENSIVE EFFORTS FOR REDUCTION AND PROCESSING, BEFORE THE DATA BECOME USEFUL TO INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS. THE DECISION TO DEVELOP AND OPERATE ONE OF THESE SYSTEMS IS USUALLY A "BIG" DECISION, INVOLVING A GREAT AMOUNT OF MONEY AND LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH SYSTEMS IS ONE WAY TO OVERCOME SOME OF THE PROBLEMS I REFERRED TO EARLIER, SUCH AS THE IMPROVING SECURITY AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE EFFORT OF OUR MAIN TARGETS, AND THE GROWING LIMITATIONS ON OUR USE OF THE TERRITORIES OF THIRD COUNTRIES. BUT THE IMPETUS TO OPERATE THESE SYSTEMS ALSO STEMS FROM OUR DESIRE TO PRODUCE BETTER INTELLIGENCE FOR THE POLICY MAKER, THE

OPERATIONS OFFICER AND THE FORCE PLANNER. TO DO THIS REQUIRES USING, AND MANY TIMES PUSHING, THE STATE-OF-THE ART -- AND TO DO SO IS COSTLY.

ANOTHER STIMULUS TO THE EXPANSION OF INTELLIGENCE STAFFS AND BUDGETS IS THE GROWING INTEREST OF OUR POLICY MAKERS IN EVERY AREA OF THE WORLD. BEFORE 1960, THE SOVIET UNION WAS THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE. THE SOVIET UNION AND (MORE RECENTLY) COMMUNIST CHINA CONTINUE TO BE OUR NUMBER ONE TARGETS, BUT THE APPETITES OF OUR CUSTOMERS NOW EXTEND TO THE POLITICAL, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS OF ALMOST ANY COUNTRY YOU MAY CARE TO NAME. THESE APPETITES ARE GETTING MORE VORACIOUS WITH EACH CRISIS. THUS, IT HAS BECOME NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN AT LEAST A MINIMUM COLLECTION EFFORT AND ANALYTICAL EXPERTISE ON EACH AND EVERY OUT-OF-THE-WAY COUNTRY, AGAINST THE MOMENT WHEN IT MAY BE PROPELLED INTO THE HEADLINES THROUGH A COUP, A WAR, OR SOME OTHER NATIONAL UPHEAVAL.

THERE IS YET ANOTHER TREND AFFECTING US ALL AS A RESULT OF THE GROWING DOLLAR AND PERSONNEL COSTS OF INTELLIGENCE. I REFER HERE TO THE PRESSURES FOR ECONOMY IN INTELLIGENCE. THE REDUCTION

IN PERSONNEL ABROAD IS ONE MANIFESTATION OF THIS. I AM SURE WE AGREE THAT EACH MEMBER AGENCY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS OCCASIONALLY SUNK A DRY HOLE AND MAY DO SO AGAIN IN THE FUTURE. BUT IN TODAY'S CLIMATE IT IS VITAL THAT WE ALL BE ECONOMY-MINDED. IN PARTICULAR, WE SHOULD WORK HARD TO ELIMINATE ACTIVITIES THAT ARE OUTMODED OR OF MARGINAL USEFULNESS -- JUST AS HARD AS WE WORK TO ACHIEVE AN IMPORTANT NEW ADVANCE. GIVEN THE GROWTH OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE BUDGET, CERTAINLY THE ECONOMY TREND WILL CONTINUE TO BE WITH US AND IT IS APPROPRIATE THAT WE RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE PRESIDENT'S ECONOMY POLICY.

NOW, WHAT ABOUT THE FRUITS OF OUR LABOR? THE TREND HERE IS THE MOST REASSURING AND SATISFYING OF ALL. IT IS MY CONSIDERED JUDGMENT THAT OUR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STANDS AT A LEVEL WHICH HAS NEVER BEEN SURPASSED. OUR INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT IS GOOD, AND I AM CONFIDENT IT WILL CONTINUE TO IMPROVE. WE DO HAVE GAPS IN INFORMATION ON SOME OF OUR MOST IMPORTANT TARGETS, AND WE SHOULD EXPECT THAT THIS WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE CASE. OCCASIONALLY OUR INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS ARE FAULTY. FOR THAT MATTER, LOOKING BACK OVER THE PAST YEAR, WE KNOW THAT THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS IN MOSCOW

AND PEKING HAVE CERTAINLY SUFFERED SOME MAJOR  
"INTELLIGENCE FAILURES."

SPEAKING OF OUR INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT AS A  
WHOLE, WE HAVE SUFFICIENT FEEDBACK FROM TOP U.S.  
POLICY MAKERS TO KNOW THAT INTELLIGENCE IS PLAY-  
ING A ROLE OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE IN THEIR DECISION-  
MAKING ON MANY OF THE MOST CRITICAL ISSUES FACING  
OUR GOVERNMENT TODAY. THE MEMBERS OF THE U.S.  
INTELLIGENCE BOARD KNOW HOW OFTEN KEY FIGURES IN  
THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMUNITY AND OUR DEFENSE  
ESTABLISHMENT REQUEST USIB VIEWS ON A VARIETY OF  
SPECIAL SUBJECTS. THESE REQUESTS ARE FREQUENT,  
AND THEY BEAR ON MOST OF THE CRITICAL DECISIONS  
FACING OUR TOP LEADERS.

INTAKING SATISFACTION IN THE PRESENT HIGH  
STATUS AND VALUE OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE EFFORT,  
I DO NOT MEAN TO SUGGEST THAT WE CAN AFFORD TO  
BE SMUG. A TRULY PROFESSIONAL GROUP AVOIDS THIS  
PITFALL, FOR "PRIDE GOETH BEFORE A FALL."

NOR CAN WE IN THE DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE  
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AFFORD THE SHORTSIGHTEDNESS  
OF INDULGING WHAT I WOULD CALL A "TRIBAL" ATTITUDE  
OF SEEING ONLY THE PROBLEMS OR INTERESTS OF ONE'S

IMMEDIATE SHOP OR AGENCY. WE MUST WORK HARD TO FOSTER A SPIRIT OF GENUINE COOPERATION, WHEREBY WE ALL SEE OUR PROBLEMS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE TOTAL EFFORT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. IN A WORD, WE NEED EMPATHY IN OUR WORK. IF WE HOLD TO THIS APPROACH, I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE ALREADY RECOGNIZED AND STILL GROWING VALUE OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EFFORT WILL OUTWEIGH ALL OF THE OTHER INTELLIGENCE TRENDS I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH YOU TODAY.